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1. Introduction 
 
Modern empirical studies of the labor market pay ample attention to labor market 
dynamics. Besides job destruction, job creation and job-to-job mobility, wage formation 
forms a corner stone of these studies (Blanchard and Diamond (1992), and Mortensen 
and Pissarides (1994)). The theoretical basis is the equilibrium search model, in which 
wage formation is described as a Nash bargaining problem of sharing the local 
monopoly rent of a successful match between an employer and an employee (see, e.g., 
Pissarides (1996)). In this paper we apply this theory to derive an empirical wage 
equation. Specifically, we specify a wage equation for the Netherlands that is derived 
from a Nash bargaining process in a flow model with three labor market states: 
employed, unemployed, and outside the labor market. The outcome of the bargaining 
process yields a specification of the wage equation with various flows between these 
labor market states as determinants.  
 
Our specification of the wage equation extends the traditional specifications of the wage 
equation, which includes some measure of unemployment as a determinant of wages. 
Phillips’ (1958) empirical relationship between wages and unemployment nowadays has 
a number of alternative theoretical foundations. Phelps (1968) has shown how the 
Phillips curve effect can be derived from the behavior of the firm. In a newer tradition, 
trade union behavior has been shown to imply the so-called wage-curve effect (Oswald 
(1982), Blanchflower and Oswald (1990), and Graafland (1992)). However, neither of 
these theoretical derivations of the wage equation prescribes that the unemployment rate 
or some transformation thereof should act as a measure for labor market tightness. 
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Instead, the theory allows for a much wider set of indicators. In this respect Blanchard 
and Katz (1997) point at the importance of labor market flows for wage setting, 
although their empirical estimates consider only the relationship between unemployment 
and wages. Broersma and Den Butter (2001, 2002) estimate specifications of wage 
equations where various labor flow variables that represent labor market tightness are 
included on an ad hoc basis. This paper builds on these previous studies. From a formal 
theoretical model we derive a specification of a flow-based wage equation, which is 
estimated using the cointegration approach. In our estimates we use aggregate time 
series data on these labor flows for the Netherlands, constructed according to a recently 
developed national accounting method (Broersma, Den Butter and Kock (2000), and 
Kock (2002)).  
 
In the next section the theoretical specification of the flow-based wage equation is 
presented. There it is also shown how our specification relates to traditional empirical 
studies of the labor market. Section 3 describes the flow data that we use and it presents 
our cointegration estimates of the wage equation, and Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2. Wages as a shared surplus of matches at the labor market 
 
Equilibrium search theory, which is the theoretical background of empirical flow 
models of the labor market, provides an adequate framework for the inclusion of labor 
market flows as determinants in the wage equation. Millard’s (1997) unemployment 
equilibrium model, for example, views wages as the result of bilateral bargaining 
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between the firm and the worker. Following Millard and Mortensen (1997) he assumes 
that bargaining is carried out in such a way to ensure efficient job destruction, i.e. jobs 
are only destroyed when it is in the interest of both the worker and the employer. 
Alternatively, in an empirical model of labor market dynamics Gautier (1997) follows 
the theoretical argumentation of Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides 
(2000) and derives a wage equation from the assumption that the surplus of a match is 
shared between the worker and the employer according to a Nash bargaining game. The 
solution of this game yields a wage equation in which outflow rates from employment 
and unemployment and outflow rates of vacancies determine wages.  
 
We follow the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides approach and derive a basic equation for 
wage formation where wages are determined as a shared surplus of matches of 
employers seeking for workers and workers searching for jobs. In equilibrium, the 
inflow into employment and unemployment equals the outflow. We start by writing 
down asset values for each of the worker and job states. For simplicity it is assumed that 
job destruction is an exogenous process. To avoid clutter we omit the time index t in 
this presentation, but note that the denominator of the flow rates should be lagged one 
period. 
 
A Basic Search Equilibrium Wage Equation 
 
The asset value of being employed is equal to the wage minus the probability to become 
unemployed (the lay-off rate) times the associated wealth loss of becoming unemployed, 
plus the expected change in the job value or: 
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[ ] EUEE W WWE
F  w= iW EU
•+−− , [1]
 
where i represents the discount rate, w is the real wage rate, WE is the asset value of 
being employed, WU is the asset value of being unemployed, FEU is the flow of workers 
from employment to unemployment and E is the employment stock. The dot indicates 
the expected change in the asset value, which is zero in equilibrium. Similarly, the asset 
value of being unemployed is given by 
 
[ ] UUEU W WWU
Fb = iW UE
•+−+ , [2]
 
where b is a flat rate unemployment benefit, and U is the unemployment stock. We 
ignore other (expected) real returns that the worker might enjoy while unemployed (cf. 
Pissarides (2000); p. 13). Along the same lines we can define the asset value of a filled 
job, WF. It is equal to the real value added (y) per worker minus wage costs (w) minus 
the lay-off rate (FEU/E) times the associated wealth change when the job is abandoned, 
 
[ ] FVFEUF W W - WE
F wy = iW
•+−− . [3]
  
Finally, the asset value of an unfilled vacancy (WV) is equal to the probability that it will 
be filled times the associated change in wealth minus the costs of forgone output and the 
costs of posting the vacancy, such as advertisement costs, 
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[ ] VVFvUEV W ycW - WV
F
 = iW
•+− . [4]
 
v
UEF  is the rate at which vacancies are filled up and it is defined by an aggregate 
matching function. We assume that the hiring costs (c) are proportional to the real value 
added per worker, which equals the value of the vacancy if a worker were to fill it.  
 
The surplus of a match is shared between the worker and the employer according to a 
Nash bargaining game. Like in the traditional wage curve models it is assumed that a 
generalized Nash bargaining solution formalizes the outcome of the bargaining process 
between a representative employee (or union) and a representative employer (or 
employers’ organization), 
 
( ) [ ] [ ] ββ −−−=Ω 1max VFUEiw WWWWwi . [5]
 
This is similar to the bargaining solution of a traditional wage curve model, where the 
worker’s and employer’s threat points represent their utility during a breakdown in the 
bargaining process. In the bargaining solution [5] of the equilibrium search model the 
threat points WU for workers and WV for employers represent the present value of 
(expected) income streams of an unemployed worker and the present value of the 
expected profit from a vacant job, respectively. β is a parameter representing the relative 
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bargaining strength of the worker, or the union1. It can be shown from the first- and 
second-order conditions of [5] that any exogenous variable that increases the threat 
point present value of the worker’s income stream or decreases the threat point present 
value of the employer’s income stream, raises the wage outcome of the bargaining 
process. Hence, a higher replacement rate increases the wage bargaining outcome. 
 
The first order maximization conditions for both the worker and employer surplus imply 
( )[ ] [ ]VFUE WWWW −=−− β1 . We can now derive the wage equation by imposing the 
condition that in equilibrium all profit opportunities from new jobs are exhausted and 
hence the value of a newly opened vacancy is zero, WV = 0. Note that in equilibrium the 
expected change in the value of a particular state (unemployed or employed) or job 
(filled or vacant) is also zero. Following Pissarides we can derive an expression of the 
wage by imposing the equilibrium condition and substituting WE and WV from [1] and 
[4] into [5], to arrive at ( )UU iWyiWw −+= β . We use the Nash bargaining solution 
and the equilibrium condition for vacant jobs, WV = 0, to arrive at 
 








−+= VF
yc
U
FbiW v
UE
UE
U β
β
1
,  
 
which we substitute into the previous expression for w to find a convenient expression 
for the equilibrium wage rate2, 
                     
1 It is usually assumed that β equals 0.5 but there may be circumstances that justify a different β, for 
example when employers and unions have different rates of impatience (Pissarides (2000)).  
2 This equilibrium condition implies that WF = yc / (FvUE / V). 
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( ) 


 ++−= v
UE
UE
F
V
U
F
cybw 11 ββ .  [6]
 
If we assume that all workers find a job by filling a vacancy, so vUEUE FF = , than we can 
rewrite [6] as ( ) ( )θββ cybw ++−= 11 . This is the basic aggregate equilibrium wage 
equation in Pissarides’ equilibrium search model with θ representing a measure of labor 
market tightness U/V/U. Note that the interest rate i drops out of the wage equation.  
 
Adding taxes, wage related benefits, and non-participants 
 
The wage equation [6] can be refined by including proportional income taxes t for 
workers and replacing the flat rate unemployment benefits b by wage related benefits 
(represented by the replacement rate rr times the wage rate). Similar to our derivation of 
wage equation [6] we can now derive  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) yF
V
U
F
c
rr
t
rr
w v
UE
UE 


 +−−+−−−
−= 1
11
1
11
1
β
β
β
β . [7]
 
From equation [6] we can see that the equilibrium wage is increasing in y, c and the flat 
rate benefit b. Increases in c (the cost of posting a vacancy) and b strengthen the 
bargaining position of the workers and as a result the wage will rise. Workers are likely 
to bargain over real after-tax wages instead of the nominal wage bill, so taxes increase 
wage demands by the worker. Therefore direct taxes and social premiums paid by 
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workers influence the bargaining outcome. Equation [7] shows that the equilibrium 
wage is decreasing in t and increasing in the replacement rate rr.  
 
In the exposition above we assumed that workers can be either employed or 
unemployed. In the real world, however, there is a third state, namely workers outside 
the labor force. Gautier (1997) derives an equation for wage formation where wages are 
determined as a shared surplus of matches in the labor market, where matches can 
originate from unemployment as well as from outside the labor force (non-participants). 
In equilibrium, inflow and outflow in each of the three states has to be equal. 
 
It is assumed that persons outside the labor force have no direct influence on wage 
formation, so the wage equation is derived by specifying asset equations for unemployed 
and employed workers and for filled and vacant jobs. Non-participants enter the wage 
formation process through the inclusion of the quit rate from employment to outside the 
labor force (FEN / E) in the asset equation for filled jobs and to include VF vNE /  (the flow 
rate from out of the labor force to employment) in the asset equation for vacant jobs. 
The asset equations [3] and [4] for filled and vacant jobs can be modified to  
 
[ ] FVFEUENF W W - WE
FF twy = iW
•++−−− , and [3’]
 
[ ] VVFvNEvUEV W ycW - WV
FF = iW
•+−+ . [4’]
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Based on these asset equations Gautier (1997) then derives the following, slightly 
modified, wage equation  
 
( ) ( )
( ) 

 ++

 +++−+


 ++++−+

 ++−+
=
U
F
E
F
V
FF
E
FFi
E
FF
 
V
FF
ib
U
F
E
F
itycy
 w
UEEU
v
NE
v
UEENEU
ENEU
v
NE
v
UEUEEU
ββ
ββ
1
1
. [7’]
 
Similar to the bare bones wage equation [7] the interest (i) rate may be omitted from this 
specification. 
 
Although the theoretical foundation of this flow-based wage curve differs from a 
traditional wage curve model like, for instance, Oswald (1982), a common feature is that 
a bargaining process determines the wage level. The main theoretical difference is in the 
way unemployment influences the bargaining outcome. In traditional wage curve 
models rising unemployment reduces the union’s bargaining power, and hence the wage 
level, because utility is lower for an unemployed worker than for an employed worker. 
In search models of the labor market with equilibrium unemployment the causality runs 
via the employer’s bargaining power. Rising unemployment reduces the employer’s 
search costs because of shorter vacancy duration and therefore lowers labor turnover 
costs, which improves the employer’s threat point in the wage bargaining process. The 
theoretical wage models presented here indicate that there are ample grounds for an 
explorative econometric analysis of the influence of labor market flows on wage 
formation. 
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There appears to be some convergence of evidence in empirical models of wage 
formation in the Netherlands (see e.g. Van de Wijngaert (1994) for a survey). Increases in 
consumers plus producers prices are fully passed on to wages as the elasticity of prices 
to wages is estimated (or set) equal to unity. In most models the same applies to labor 
productivity; in many models there is a unit, or at least near-unit elasticity between 
productivity and wages. In other words the wage space is fully used for wage increases. 
The wage space is defined as the sum of price inflation and labor productivity and has 
played an important role as a benchmark in wage negotiations in the Netherlands. A 
recent example of an empirical study on wage formation in the Netherlands using the 
wage bargaining model is the wage equation included in the JADE-model of the CPB 
Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB, 2003). This equation is 
traditional in the sense that unemployment plays (amongst others) a role as determinant 
for wage formation in a wage curve specification. The equation encompasses empirical 
knowledge on wage formation in the Netherlands. Its focus is on the tax wedge, and 
more specifically on the possibilities for employers and workers to pass on increases in 
direct taxes and social security contributions to customers (through higher prices) and 
employers (through higher wages) respectively. Like in our empirical model of the next 
section, the wage equation in JADE is specified as a cointegration and error correction 
model. It allows for an asymmetric influence of the wedge on the short run, whereas the 
influence of the wedge on long run wage formation is symmetric although its incidence 
does not completely fall on workers.  
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3.  Empirical implementation 
 
The flow variables used in our estimates are defined as rates, where a flow from x to y is 
indicated as fxy = FXY/Xt–1. We use the following variables: feu = FEU/Et–1 (flow from 
employment to unemployment, or the lay-off rate) and fue = FUE/Ut–1 (the flow from 
unemployment to employment, or the hiring rate). The flow from employment to out of 
the labor force (the quit rate) is defined as fen = FEN/Et–1. It consists of workers who 
quit their job due to regular and early retirement and workers who leave the labor force 
due to disability. The other two flow variables in equation [7’] relate to vacancy outflow 
due to unemployed or persons out of the labor force who find a job by filling a vacancy, 
1/ −= tvUE UFfuev  and 1/ −= tvNE NFfnev , respectively. The flow data that we use for 
estimation are constructed using a national accounting method, which is discussed in 
Broersma, Den Butter and Kock (2000) and Kock (2002). We use annual data and the 
sample period is 1970-1997 (see the data appendix for details). 
 
 
Cointegration equation 
 
Equation [7] can be log-linearized using a first order Taylor approximation. This 
equation serves as the basis for the more complicated wage equation [7’], which we 
therefore assume can also be log-linearized. Given the limited number of observations 
available we use the basic cointegration approach and the two-step procedure of Engel 
and Granger (1987) to specify our empirical model. First the static long-term 
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equilibrium wage level relation is estimated. In the second step we estimate the 
associated dynamic error correction specification. Unit roots indicate that the flow 
variables in our modeling exercise can all be considered as stationary (see the Appendix 
for unit root tests). The other wage curve variables are all I(1).  
 
Table 1 — Estimation results of the cointegration equation 
 
  
log (w) =  0.68 log y – 0.77 log (1–t) + 1.08 log rr – 1.28 feu  
  (–3.93)          (24.95)         (–3.23)        (11.54)         
– 5.74 fen + 0.004 (fuev + fnev) – 7.28 
   (–3.66)           (–2.93)              (–13.32) 
 
Adjusted R2 = 0.99; ADF = 4.44; PP = 3.83; DW = 1.53; N=26 
 
ADF = Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic on stability of the residuals of the regression. PP = 
Phillips-Perron test statistic on stability of the residuals. Critical value at 5 percent significance level is 
3.59. DW is the Durbin Watson test statistic. t-statistics are in parentheses. N is the number of 
observations. Sample period: 1970-1997. Estimation method: OLS 
 
The estimation results of a static long-term equilibrium wage level relation based on a 
linearized version of equation [7’] are reported in Table 1. The outflow out of 
unemployment turned out not to be significant and was dropped from the final 
estimation. A test could not reject equality of the coefficients of the two variables that 
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represent vacancy outflow due to employment inflow from unemployment and due to 
employment inflow from out of the labor force, and hence these two variables were 
combined into a single indicator of labor market tension.  
 
The replacement rate, productivity and tax variables all show the correct sign. Higher 
benefits increase the bargaining power of workers, thereby raising the real wage rate. In 
fact, the estimated coefficient of 1.08 for the replacement rate suggests full adjustment 
of wages to changes in the benefit level in the long run: when benefits rise with 1 
percentage point over wages in the end this leads to an equal rise in the wage level. 
Other studies find less then full adjustment; with coefficient values between 0.17 and 
0.33 (see Van de Wijngaert (1994), and the previous discussion on the JADE-model). 
Still, we feel that our specification of a long-run relationship suggests that a constant 
replacement rate is plausible. It is also consistent with the long-standing Dutch policy of 
annually adjusting benefits in line with the average nominal wage increase in the private 
sector in the past year. The long run adjustment coefficient for productivity of 0.68 is 
broadly in line with the results of other studies, which find coefficients between 0.71 
and 1.09. Apparently workers are able to translate more than two-thirds of the 
productivity increases into higher wages, leaving employers and other capital providers 
with the remainder. Our estimates seem consistent with the notion that tax cuts support 
wage moderation (the estimated coefficient for the tax rate of –0.77 is within the range 
of most other studies). Proponents claim that a policy of tax cuts contributed 
significantly to employment growth in the Netherlands in the 1980s and 1990s, often 
suggesting that the tax cuts were part of a coordinated policy effort by the government, 
unions and employers that enabled unions to moderate wage demands. However, our 
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results also allow for an alternative interpretation, which suggests that tax cuts 
stimulated labor supply, which led to lower wage pressure.   
 
Note that the specification of our wage equation is neither a wage curve, nor a Phillips 
curve. A wage curve explains the wage level by the level of unemployment, or similar, 
wage growth is explained by the change in unemployment. A Phillips curve, on the 
other hand, explains wage growth by the level of unemployment. Both the wage curve 
and the Phillips curve can be seen as the outcome of a wage negotiation process between 
employers and employees (Blanchflower and Oswald (1990), and Knoester and Van der 
Windt (1987)). Although we also derive our wages from such a negotiation process, we 
find instead that the wage level is explained by labor market flows. In fact these flows 
are employment inflow from unemployment and non-participation and employment 
outflow to unemployment and non-participation. The underlying implication is that it is 
labor market flows instead of the change or the level of the unemployment rate that 
determine the bargaining power of employers and employees. So, our flow-based wage 
curve is linked to the traditional wage- and Phillips-curve theories since in all three 
bargaining between workers and employers determine the wage outcome. Another link 
appears when we focus on the flows into and out of unemployment. With a similar but 
opposite effect of these flows on the wage level, the wage level in our model would 
depend on the change in unemployment, or, in terms of growth, wage growth would be 
explained by the acceleration or deceleration of unemployment growth. It implies that 
the specification of our model of wage formation differs from both the wage curve 
specification and from the Phillips curve specification. To what extent does this 
empirical outcome make sense from an economic perspective? We think it does. For 
 
 
 
16
instance, in case of a recession we observe an increase in the inflow into unemployment, 
which in our model reduces the bargaining power of workers and therefore cause 
moderate wage growth. In other words, changes in labor market flows govern wage 
growth rates instead of changes in (or levels of) labor market stocks. This paper 
provides both a theoretical and empirical underpinning of this insight. 
 
 
Dynamic wage equation 
 
We used the cointegration equation to estimate the dynamic wage equation in error 
correction form (Table 2). We preferred to specify the non-flow indicators in logs to 
establish a relation between the percentage change in the real wage rate and the 
percentage change in productivity, taxes and the replacement rate (cf. Graafland (1990a, 
1990b)). The indicators of labor market tension are specified as first differences of flow 
rates. Our specification approach is to move from a general to a specific model. The 
general model specification includes contemporaneous and lagged dynamic variables 
and the error correction term from the model in Table 1.  
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Table 2 — Estimation results of the dynamic wage equation 
 
 
∆ log (w) = 0.95 ∆ log y  – 0.73 ∆ log (1–t) + 0.73 ∆ log rr – 1.48 ∆ feu–1 
   (–2.04)               (6.68)             (–3.02)               (7.26)                  
– 4.01 ∆ fen–1  – 0.003 ∆ (fuev–1 + fnev–1) – 0.65 err–1 – 0.006 
     (–3.18)                  (–2.71)                       (–3.49)       (–1.65) 
 
Adjusted R2 = 0.83; SSR = 0.001; SE = 0.008; DW = 2.13; N=25 
 
SSR is the sum of squared residuals and SE is the standard error of regression. DW is the Durbin 
Watson test statistic. err is the derived residual from the cointegration equation. t-statistics are in 
parentheses. N is the number of observations. Sample period: 1970-1997. Estimation method: OLS. 
 
Our estimation results suggest an almost instant adjustment of wages to changes in 
productivity, possibly because workers are successfully forward looking with respect to 
productivity changes and take this into account when negotiating nominal wages. Policy 
changes might be more difficult to predict, which would explain why wage adjustments 
in response to changes in the tax rate and the replacement rate take somewhat longer, 
although with a coefficient of 0.73 the short run adjustment elasticities are still quite 
high.  
 
The lay-off rate (feu) and the flow of workers who leave the labor force (fen) push the 
wage rate down. The results that we find for the lay-off rate are comparable with other 
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studies for the Netherlands, with long run coefficients between –1.20 and –2.01 (see 
Van de Wijngaert (1994)). Perhaps the most noticeable result is that the wage impact of 
the lay-off rate is less then the wage impact of the flow out of the labor force. The latter 
flow has not been used in an empirical study before, as far as we know. A plausible 
explanation would be that the average wage rate is lower for workers that are being laid-
off than for workers leaving the labor force for retirement or other non-participation 
because workers in the later group are most likely older, have higher productivity and 
are more unionized. Another way to see this is to consider the impact of different 
outflow rates for these two groups over the business cycle. In a boom the lay-off rate 
will decrease more than the separation rate to non-participation, because most people 
will make their retirement decision independent of the business cycle. Faced with a 
smaller stock of unemployed workers to hire from, employers are then forced to hire 
more expensive non-participants, pushing up the wage rate even further. In a recession 
the more or less constant outflow of relatively expensive workers to non-participation 
reinforces the downward wage pressure, which is a result of lay-offs. 
 
The impact of the flow of filled vacancies turns out surprisingly small. The error 
correction term in the dynamic wage equation is significant and indicates that current 
wages are corrected for past errors. The coefficient of 0.65 indicates shat short run 
(partial) adjustment is quite fast, although in the JADE model a coefficient value of 0.85 
was found which suggest that wages approach their long run levels even more quickly.  
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4. Conclusion 
 
This paper empirically investigates the influence of labor market dynamics on wage 
formation. The ‘traditional’ literature models wage formation either as a Phillips curve 
(where the unemployment rate is a determinant of the change in the wage rate) or a 
wage curve (where the unemployment rate is a determinant of the wage level). Our 
specification of the wage curve implies a third possible long-term relationship between 
wages and economic variables: the wage level is a function of labor market flows and 
other explanatory variables. In fact, we use the change in the unemployment rate as an 
explanatory variable in the wage curve, since flows in and out of unemployment 
determine the change in the level of unemployment in each period.   
 
We find that labor market flows are suitable substitutes for traditional indicators of labor 
market tightness and hence qualify for inclusion into the wage equation. More 
specifically, we find that a combination of the outflow from employment to 
unemployment (lay-offs), outflow from employment to non-participation, and the 
outflow of vacancies (successful matches) determine the wage level. This corroborates 
with the theoretical foundation of the wage equation, which describes wage formation as 
the outcome of a bargaining game between employers and employees, where the relative 
bargaining power depends on labor market tightness. Our results support the notion that 
especially in the context of equilibrium search theory labor market flows are relevant for 
the outcome of the wage bargaining process.  
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Data appendix 
 
The flow data used in this paper were constructed using a national accounting system 
for labor market flows, which is discussed in Broersma, Den Butter and Kock (2000) 
and Kock (2002). The other data were obtained from the national accounts of Statistics 
Netherlands (CBS) and the CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 
(CPB). We use annual data and the sample period is 1970-1997. 
 
Variables 
w  real wage rate of workers in enterprises, source: CPB. 
y  value added per worker, market sector only, source: CPB. 
rr  replacement rate, weighted average of welfare and unemployment insurance 
benefits, source: CPB. 
t  direct taxes on wage income (transaction based), source: CPB. 
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Appendix: Unit root tests  
 
Bold figure indicates that a unit root cannot be rejected (5 percent confidence level). In 
the last column we present the order of integration. Fxy indicates a flow from x to y, 
whereas adding v indicates that the flow constitutes filling a vacancy. For example, fnev 
 represents a non-participant filling a vacancy. U and v indicate the stock of unemployed 
workers and vacancies, respectively. Vo stands for vacancy outflow, and vi stands for 
vacancy inflow. Fee indicates job-to-job movements. All data are annual.  
 
Table A — Labor market variables  
 
Variable ADFt  ADFc ADF PPt  PPc PP I(x) 
Log u -2.10 -2.71 -0.31 -2.18 -3.60 0.10  
∆log u -3.92 -3.59 -3.79 -3.07 -2.58 -2.70 I(1) 
Log v -3.15 -3.19 -0.14 -2.13 -2.53  0.29  
∆ log v -4.06 -4.03 -4.11 -2.92 -2.87 -2.94 I(1) 
Log vo -2.80 -2.92 -0.09 -2.57 -2.84  0.13  
∆ log vo -4.16 -4.12 -4.24 -4.61 -4.47 -4.57 I(1) 
Log vi -2.79 -2.95 -0.00 -2.37 -2.68  0.17  
∆ log vi -3.96 -3.89 -4.00 -4.52 -4.32 -4.40 I(1) 
Log fee -2.26 -2.29  0.17 -2.18 -2.19  0.21  
∆ log fee -2.57 -2.60 -2.66 -4.36 -4.40 -4.46 I(1) 
Log feev -3.15 -2.28 -0.42 -2.95 -2.35 -0.25  
∆ log feev -4.66 -4.61 -4.72 -5.19 -5.01 -5.14 I(1) 
Log feu -3.78 -1.82 -0.72 -3.16 -2.35 -1.43  
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Variable ADFt  ADFc ADF PPt  PPc PP I(x) 
∆ log feu -3.78 -3.87 -3.92 -4.02 -4.15 -4.21 I(1) 
Log fue -1.77 -2.73 -2.68 -2.08 -3.30 -3.33  
∆ log fue -3.76 -3.16 -3.28 -5.53 -4.61 -4.62 I(1) 
Log fuev -2.52 -2.68 -0.83 -2.11 -2.29 -0.72  
∆ log fuev -3.05 -3.07 -3.15 -4.03 -4.03 -4.11 I(1) 
Log fen -1.19 -1.92 -0.33 -1.19 -2.01 -0.36  
∆ log fen -3.86 -3.05 -3.10 -6.09 -5.25 -5.34 I(1) 
Log fne -3.48 -1.98 -0.61 -3.25 -2.20 -0.89  
∆ log fne -5.40 -5.54 -5.50 -6.57 -6.64 -6.69 I(1) 
 
 
 
26
 
Table A (continued) 
 
Variable ADFt  ADFc ADF PPt  PPc PP I(x) 
Log fnev -2.86 -2.91 -1.26 -3.14 -3.48 -1.60  
∆ log fnev -5.08 -4.90 -4.87 -6.67 -6.40 -6.38 I(1) 
Log fun -1.73 -2.12 -0.70 -1.90 -2.76 -0.71  
∆ log fun -3.38 -2.85 -3.03 -3.79 -3.02 -3.12 I(1) 
Log fnu -2.46 -1.96 0.35 -2.96 -2.63 0.61  
∆ log fnu -4.25 -4.25 -4.33 -6.48 -6.54 -6.64 I(1) 
        
Critical value, α=5%, n=26 -3.59 -2.98 -1.95 -3.59 -2.98 -1.95  
Unit root tests: Augmented Dickey-Fuller with trend (ADFt), Augmented Dickey-Fuller with constant 
(ADFc), Augmented Dickey-Fuller with no trend and no constant (ADF), Phillips-Perron with trend 
(PPt), Phillips-Perron with constant (PPc), Phillips-Perron with no trend and no constant (PP). 
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Table B — Other variables  
 
Variable ADFt  ADFc ADF PPt  PPc PP I(x) 
log w -3.63 -2.73 0.33 -4.23 -8.81 2.79  
∆ log w -1.32 -1.48 -1.80 -1.27 -1.66 -2.25  
∆∆ log w -4.54 -3.87 -3.38 -4.81 -4.72 -4.63 I(2) 
log y -2.43 -2.74  3.06 -2.54 -4.35  5.63  
∆ log y -4.18 -3.19 -1.38 -5.12 -4.15 -2.05 I(1) 
log t -2.40 -2.69 -1.30 -2.51 -3.34 -1.82  
∆ log t -3.53 -3.34 -3.20 -4.59 -4.38 -4.21 I(1) 
log rr -2.63 -1.44 -0.26 -1.93 -1.06 -0.17  
∆ log rr -3.78 -2.30 -2.65 -2.85 -2.31 -2.36 I(1) 
        
Critical value, α=5%, n=26 -3.59 -2.98 -1.95 -3.59 -2.98 -1.95  
Unit root tests: Augmented Dickey-Fuller with trend (ADFt), Augmented Dickey-Fuller with constant 
(ADFc), Augmented Dickey-Fuller with no trend and no constant (ADF), Phillips-Perron with trend 
(PPt), Phillips-Perron with constant (PPc), Phillips-Perron with no trend and no constant (PP). 
